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ABSTRACT 
Market failure is described and discussed. A summary of the current state of understanding 
is provided. Key words are: market failure, public good, externalities, rational expectations, 
information, monopoly, and competitive equilibrium. 
MARKET FAILURE 
John 0. Ledyard 
The best way to understand market failure is first to understand market success, the ability of 
a collection of idealized competitive markets to achieve an equilibrium allocation of resources which 
is Pareto-optimal. This characteristic of markets, which was loosely conjectured by Adam Smith, 
has received its clearest expression in the theorems of modem welfare economics. For our purposes 
the first of these, named the First Fundamental Theorem of welfare economics, is of most interest. 
Simply stated it reads: (1) if there are enough markets, (2) if all consumers and producers behave 
competitively, and (3) if an equilibrium exists, then the allocation of resources in that equilibrium 
will be Pareto-optimal. (See Arrow (1951] or Debreu (1959].) Market failure is said to occur when 
the conclusion of this theorem is false, that is, when the allocations achieved with markets are not 
cf'ficient. 
Market failure is often the justification for political intervention in the marketplace. (For 
one view see Bator (1958], Section V.) The standard argument is that if market allocations are 
inefficient everyone can and should be made better off. To understand the feasibility and desirability 
of such Pareto-improving interventions, we must achieve a deeper understanding of the sources of 
market failure. Since each must be due to the failure of at least one of the three conditions of the 
First Theorem, we will consider those conditions one at a time. 
The first condition requires there to be enough markets. Although there are no definitive 
guidelines as to what constitutes "enough," the general principle is that if any actor in the economy 
cares about something that also involves an interaction with at least one other actor, then there 
should be a market for that something; it should have a price (Arrow (1969]). This is true whether 
the something is consumption of bread, consumption of the smoke from a factory, or the amount of 
national defense. The first of these examples is a standard private good, the second is an extemality, 
and the third is a public good. All need to be priced if we are to achieve a Pareto-optimal allocation 
of resources; without these markets, actors may be unable to inform others about mutually beneficial 
trades which can leave both better off. 
The informational role of marlcets is clearly highlighted by a classic example of market 
failure analyzed by Scitovsky [1954]. In this example, a steel industry, which must decide now 
whether to operate, will be profitable if and only if a railroad industry will begin operations within 
five years. The railroad industry will be profitable if and only if the steel industry is operating when 
the railroad industry begins its own operations. Clearly each cares about the other and it is efficient 
for each to operate; the steel industry begins today and the railroad industry begins later. 
Nevertheless, if there are only spot markets for steel, the railroad industry cannot easily inform the 
steel industry of its interests through the marketplace. This inability to communicate desirable 
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interactions and to coordinate timing is an example of market failure and has been used as a 
justification for public involvement in development efforts: a justification for national planning. 
However, if we correctly recognize that there are simply too few markets, we can easily find another 
solution by creating a futures market for steel. If the railroad industry is able to pay today for 
delivery of steel at some specified date in the future, then both steel and railroad industries are able 
to make the other aware of their interests through the marketplace. It is easy to show that as long as 
agents behave competitively and equilibrium exists the addition of futures markets will solve this 
type of market failure. 
A completely different example of the informational role of markets arises when actors in 
the marketplace are asymmetrically informed about the true state of an uncertain world. The classic 
example involves securities markets where insiders may know something that outsiders do not. 
Even if it is important and potentially profitable for the uninformed actor to know the information 
held by the informed actor, there may not be enough markets to generate an efficient allocation of 
resources. To see this most clearly suppose there are only two possible states of the world. Further 
suppose there are two consumers, one of whom knows the true state and one of whom thinks each 
state is equally likely. If the only markets that exist are markets for physical commodities, then the 
equilibrium allocation will not in general be Pareto-optimal. One solution is to create a contingent 
claims market. An "insurance" contract can be created in which delivery and acceptance of a 
specified amount of the commodity is contingent on the true state of the world. Assuming both 
parties can, ex post, mutually verify which is indeed the true state of the world, if both behave 
competitively and an equilibrium allocation exists, it will be Pareto-optimal, given the information 
structure. A more general and precise version of this theorem can be found in Radner [1968]. 
Analyzing this example further we note that in equilibrium the prices of commodities in the 
state which is not true will be close to or equal to zero, since at positive prices the informed actor 
will always be willing to supply an infinite amount contingent on the false state, knowing delivery 
will be unnecessary. If the uninformed actor is clever and realizes that prices will behave this way in 
equilibrium then he can become informed simply by observing which contingency prices are zero. If 
he then uses this information which has been freely provided by the market, the equilibrium will be 
Pareto-optimal under full information. In a very simple form this is the idea behind rational 
expectations (see Muth [1961]). With clever competitive actors it may not be necessary to create all 
markets in order to achieve a Pareto-efficient equilibrium allocation. 
Completing markets seems to be an easy technique to correct market failure. The 
suggestions that taxes and subsidies (Pigou [1932]) or property rights reassignments (Coase [1960]) 
can cure market failure follow directly from this observation. However, an unintended consequence 
can sometimes occur after the creation of these marlcets. In some cases adding more marlcets may 
cause conditions (2) and (3) of the First Theorem to be false. Curing one form of market failure can 
lead to another. To understand how this happens and how the second condition requiring 
competitive behavior can be affected consider the informed consumer in our previous example. If he 
realizes that the uninformed consumer is going to make inferences based indirectly on his actions, 
then he should not behave competitively because he could do better by pretending to be uninformed. 
He can, by strategically limiting the supply of information of which he is the monopoly holder, do 
better than if he behaved competitively. It is only his willingness to supply infinite amounts of the 
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commodity in the false state that gives away his knowledge. Supplying only a little commodity 
contingent on that (false) state in return for a small payment today would not allow the uninformed 
agent to infer anything and would allow the informed agent to make a profit from his monopoly 
position. This is not very different from the standard example of a violation of condition (2), 
monopoly supply of a commodity. 
A different example of this phenomenon of unintended outcomes arises when markets are 
created to allocate public goods. It is now well known that the introduction of personal, Lindahl 
prices to price individual demands for a public good does indeed lead to Pareto- optimal allocations 
if consumers behave competitively (see Foley (1970]). However, under this scheme, each agent 
becomes a monopsonist in one of the created markets and, therefore, has an incentive to understate 
demand and not to take prices as given. This is the phenomenon of "free riding," often alluded to as 
the reason the creation of markets may not be a viable solution to market failure. To understand why, 
let us now examine the second condition of the First Theorem in more detail. 
The second condition of the First Theorem about market success is that all actors in the 
marketplace behave competitively. This means that each must act as if they cannot affect prices and, 
given prices, as if they follow optimizing behavior. Consumers maximize preferences subject to 
budget constraints and producers maximize profits, each taking prices as fixed parameters. This 
condition will be violated when actors can affect the values that equilibrium prices take and in so 
doing be better off. The standard example of market failure due to a violation of this condition is 
monopoly in which one actor is the sole supplier of an output. By artificially restricting supply this 
actor can cause higher prices and make himself better off even though the resulting equilibrium 
allocation will be inefficient. 
Can we correct market failure due to non-competitive behavior? To find an answer let us 
first isolate those conditions under which agents find it in their interests to follow competitive 
behavior. The work of Roberts and Postlewaite (1976] has established that if each agent holds only a 
small amount of resources relative to the aggregate available, then they will usually be unable to 
manipulate prices in any significant way and will act as price takers. It is the depth of the market 
that is important. This is also true when the commodity is information. If each agent is 
informationally small, in the sense that they either know very little or what they know is of little 
importance to others, then they lose little by behaving competitively. (See Postlewaite and 
Schmeidler (1986].) On the other hand, if they are informationally important, as in the earlier 
example, they may have an incentive to behave non-competitively. The key is the size of the agent's 
resources, both real and informational, relative to the market. 
The solution to market failure from non-competitive behavior then seems to be to ensure that 
all agents are both resource and informationally small. Of course this must be accomplished thro_
ugh
direct intervention as in the anti-trust laws and the securities market regulations of the United States 
and may not be feasible. For example, it may not be possible to correct this type of market failure by 
simply telling agents to behave competitively. In such an attempt, one would try to enforce a public 
policy that all firms must charge prices equal to the marginal cost of output. But, unless the costs 
and production technology of the firm can be directly monitored, a monopolist can easily act as if he 
is setting price equal to marginal cost while using a false cost curve. It would be impossible for an 
outside observer to distinguish this non-competitive behavior from competitive behavior without 
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directly monitoring the cost curve. If the monopolist were a consumer whose preferences were 
unobservable, then even monitoring would not help. In general, market failure from non­
competitive behavior is difficult to correct while still retaining markets. We will hint at some 
alternatives below. 
Expansion of the number of markets can also lead to violations of the third condition of the 
First Theorem. For illustration we consider three examples. The first and simplest of these is the 
case of increasing returns to scale in production. The classic case is a product which requires a fixed 
set-up cost and a constant marginal cost to produce. (More generally we could consider non-convex 
production possibilities sets.) If the finn acts competitively in this industry and if the price is above 
the marginal cost the finn will supply an infinite amount. If the price is at or below marginal cost the 
firm will produce nothing. If the consumers' quantity demanded is positive and finite at a price 
equal to marginal cost, then there is no price such that supply equals demand. Equilibrium does not 
exist. The real implication of this situation is not that markets do not equilibrate or that trade does 
not take place, it is that a natural monopoly exists. There is room for at most one efficient finn in 
this industry. Again it is the assumption of competitive behavior which is ultimately violated. 
The next example, due to Starrett [1972], involves an external diseconomy. Suppose there is 
an upstream finn that pollutes the water and a downstream finn that requires clean water as an input 
into its production process. It is easy to show that if such a diseconomy exists and if the downstream 
firm always has the option of inaction (i.e., it can use no inputs to produce no outputs at zero cost), 
then the aggregate production possibilities set of the economy when expanded to allow enough 
markets cannot be convex. (See Ledyard [1976] for a fonnal proof.) If the production possibilities 
set of the economy is non-convex then, as in the last example, it is possible that a competitive 
equilibrium will not exist. Expansion of the number of markets to solve the inefficiencies due to 
external diseconomies can lead to a situation in which there is no competitive equilibrium. 
The last example, first observed by Green [1977] and Kreps [1977], arises in situations of 
asymmetric infonnation. Recall the earlier example in which one agent was fully infonned about the 
state of the world while the other thought each state was equally likely. Suppose preferences and 
endowments in each state are such that if both know the state, then the equilibrium prices in each 
state are the same. Further, suppose that if the uninformed agent makes no inferences about the state 
from the other's behavior then there will be different prices in each state. Then no (rational 
expectations) equilibrium will exist. If the infonned agent tries to make inferences the prices will 
not infonn him, and if the uninfonned agent does not try to make inferences the prices will inform 
him. Further, it is fairly easy to show that if a market for infonnation could be created (ignoring 
incentives to hide infonnation) the resulting possibilities set is in general non-convex. In either case 
there is no equilibrium. 
Most examples of non-existence of equilibrium seem to lead inevitably to non-competitive 
behavior. In our example of non-existence due to informational asymmetries, it is natural for the 
informed agent to behave as a monopolist with respect to that information. In the example of the 
diseconomy, if a market is created between the upstream and the downstream firm, each becomes a 
monopoly. If there is a single polluter and many pollutees, the polluter holds a position similar to a 
monopsony. The non-existence problem due to the fundamental non-convexity caused by the use of 
markets to eliminate external diseconomies is simply finessed by one or more of the participants 
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assuming non-competitive behavior. An outcome occurs but it is not competitive and, therefore, not 
efficient. 
Market failure, the inefficient allocation of resources with markets, can occur if there are too 
few markets, non-competitive behavior, or non-existence problems. Many suggested solutions for 
market failure, such as tax-subsidy schemes, property rights assignments, and special pricing 
arrangements, are simply devices for the creation of more markets. If this can be done in a way that 
avoids non-convexities and ensures depth of participation, then the remedy can be beneficial and the 
new allocation should be efficient. On the other hand, if the addition of markets creates either non­
convexities or shallow participation, then attempts to cure market failure from too few markets will 
simply lead to market failure from monopolistic behavior. Market failure in this latter situation is 
fundamental. Examples are natural monopolies, external diseconomies, public goods, and 
informational monopolies. If one wants to achieve efficient allocations of resources in the presence 
of such fundamental failures one must accept self-interested behavior and explore non-market 
alternatives. A literature using this approach, sometimes called implementation theory and 
sometimes called mechanism design theory, was initiated by Hurwicz [1972] and is surveyed in 
Groves and Ledyard (1986). 
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